El artículo propone trabajar junto al film Las mil y una (Navas, 2020, Argentina) y la noción de penumbra, para poner a reflexionar la noción de archivo y su temporalidad, los afectos y la sexualidad disidente. Para ello retoma la propuesta de Ann Cvetkovich de volver sobre el trauma queer para analizar la diversidad de respuestas colectivas que se pueden generar, condensadas en un posible archivo de sentimientos. Siguiendo a Natalia Taccetta, repaso allí las implicancias de un archivo que atienda (...) a las circulaciones sexo-afectivas y su relación íntima con la temporalidad, con la noción de crononormatividad de Elizabeth Freeman. El cine permite, apunta Taccetta, volver al pasado no solo cognoscible sino perceptible: Las mil y una integra el archivo de nuestras reflexiones sobre la identidad, las temporalidades en que con-vivimos y las economías afectivas que estas (des)habilitan. Poniendo en jaque la contemporaneidad, su título reenvía tanto al clásico relato de Scheherezade como a la expresión coloquial de una cadena de acontecimientos desafortunados, mientras recupera el nombre del barrio correntino que inspira y sitúa el film. Los personajes invitan a un parcours de orientaciones queer, en cuanto no heteronormadas pero tampoco clasificables en otras identidades. En un escenario sexoafectivo lejos de las apps y sus taxonomías, el film abre paso a las tensiones no resueltas entre la búsqueda y el escondite, la promesa y la amenaza que conviven en la penumbra. (shrink)

In this paper we focus on transmission and failure of transmission of warrant. We identify three individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for transmission of warrant, and we show that their satisfaction grounds a number of interesting epistemic phenomena that have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. We then scrutinise Wright’s analysis of transmission failure and improve on extant readings of it. Nonetheless, we present a Bayesian counterexample that shows that Wright’s analysis is partially incoherent with our analysis of (...) warrant transmission and prima facie defective. We conclude exploring three alternative lines of reply: developing a more satisfactory account of transmission failure, which we outline; dismissing the Bayesian counterexample by rejecting some of its assumptions; reinterpreting Wright’s analysis to make it immune to the counterexample. (shrink)

Crispin Wright has given an explanation of how a first time warrant can fall short of transmitting across a known entailment. Formal epistemologists have struggled to turn Wright’s informal explanation into cogent Bayesian reasoning. In this paper, I analyse two Bayesian models of Wright’s account respectively proposed by Samir Okasha and Jake Chandler. I argue that both formalizations are unsatisfactory for different reasons, and I lay down a third Bayesian model that appears to me to capture the valid kernel of (...) Wright’s explanation. After this, I consider a recent development in Wright’s account of transmission failure. Wright suggests that his condition sufficient for transmission failure of first time warrant also suffices for transmission failure of supplementary warrant. I propose an interpretation of Wright’s suggestion that shield it from objections. I then lay down a fourth Bayesian framework that provides a simplified model of the unified explanation of transmission failure envisaged by Wright. (shrink)

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you often have prima facie justification for believing p that doesn’t rest on your independent justification for believing any proposition. Although dogmatism has an intuitive appeal and seems to have an antisceptical bite, it has been targeted by various objections. This paper principally aims to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is inconsistent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects our rational credences. (...) If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that our experiences and our introspective beliefs that we have experiences have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also consider the question whether dogmatism has an antisceptical bite. I suggest that the answer turns on whether or not the Bayesian can determine the priors of hypotheses and conjectures on the grounds of their extra-empirical virtues. If the Bayesian can do so, the thesis that dogmatism has an antisceptical bite is probably false. (shrink)

En Argentina, uno de los sectores que permaneció más tiempo en situación de Aislamiento Social Preventivo y Obligatorio fue la educación. La continuidad educativa en contextos de vulnerabilidad social fue errática. Si bien, el obstáculo más visible y sin dudas central en términos de inequidad fue la falta de conectividad y la carencia de tecnología para alcanzar la educación virtual, cabe reconocer otros componentes significativos como las dificultades de los adultos para acompañar los procesos educativos de sus hijos/as, especialmente de (...) los que transitaban la educación secundaria. Para las madres “hacer de maestras” fue frustrante, angustiante y motivo de preocupación por el futuro de sus hijos/as. Para los adolescentes la escuela perdió centralidad como regulador de sus rutinas, se alteró el tiempo de sueño, y trajo aparejado desequilibrios emocionales. La escuela, una vez más, ejerció un rol central en la asistencia alimentaria y gracias a ello muchos adolescentes tuvieron un contacto períodico con algún docente. El contexto pandémico profundizó las privaciones de los hogares, evidenció las carencias preexistentes, y la pobreza de las estructuras de oportunidades educativas de los espacios socioresidenciales segregados. (shrink)

Transmission of justification across inference is a valuable and indeed ubiquitous epistemic phenomenon in everyday life and science. It is thanks to the phenomenon of epistemic transmission that inferential reasoning is a means for substantiating predictions of future events and, more generally, for expanding the sphere of our justified beliefs or reinforcing the justification of beliefs that we already entertain. However, transmission of justification is not without exceptions. As a few epistemologists have come to realise, more or less trivial forms (...) of circularity can prevent justification from transmitting from p to q even if one has justification for p and one is aware of the inferential link from p to q. In interesting cases this happens because one can acquire justification for p only if one has independent justification for q. In this case the justification for q cannot depend on the justification for p and the inferential link from p to q, as genuine transmission would require. The phenomenon of transmission failure seems to shed light on philosophical puzzles, such as Moore's proof of a material world and McKinsey's paradox, and it plays a central role in various philosophical debates. For this reason it is being granted continued and increasing attention. (shrink)

I review recent work on Phenomenal Conservatism, the position introduced by Michael Huemer according to which if it seems that P to a subject S, in the absence of defeaters S has thereby some degree of justification for believing P.

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a (...) “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “ n -opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m ” ( m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid). (shrink)

[NOTE: I WROTE THIS PAPER BEFORE STARTING MY PhD. SO DON'T EXPECT TOO MUCH.] Laudan and Leplin have argued that empirically equivalent theories can elude underdetermination by resorting to indirect confirmation. Moreover, they have provided a qualitative account of indirect confirmation that Okasha has shown to be incoherent. In this paper, I develop Kukla's recent contention that indirect confirmation is grounded in the probability calculus. I provide a Bayesian rule to calculate the probability of a hypothesis given indirect evidence. I (...) also suggest that the application of the rule presupposes the methodological relevance of non‐empirical virtues of theories. If this is true, Laudan and Leplin's strategy will not work in many cases. Moreover, without an independent way of justifying the role of non‐empirical virtues in methodology, the scientific realists cannot use indirect evidence to defeat underdetermination. (shrink)

Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.

The logical hexagon (or hexagon of opposition) is a strange, yet beautiful, highly symmetrical mathematical figure, mysteriously intertwining fundamental logical and geometrical features. It was discovered more or less at the same time (i.e. around 1950), independently, by a few scholars. It is the successor of an equally strange (but mathematically less impressive) structure, the “logical square” (or “square of opposition”), of which it is a much more general and powerful “relative”. The discovery of the former did not raise interest, (...) neither among logicians, nor among philosophers of logic, whereas the latter played a very important theoretical role (both for logic and philosophy) for nearly two thousand years, before falling in disgrace in the first half of the twentieth century: it was, so to say, “sentenced to death” by the so-called analytical philosophers and logicians. Contrary to this, since 2004 a new, unexpected promising branch of mathematics (dealing with “oppositions”) has appeared, “oppositional geometry” (also called “n-opposition theory”, “NOT”), inside which the logical hexagon (as well as its predecessor, the logical square) is only one term of an infinite series of “logical bi-simplexes of dimension m”, itself just one term of the more general infinite series (of series) of the “logical poly-simplexes of dimension m”. In this paper we recall the main historical and the main theoretical elements of these neglected recent discoveries. After proposing some new results, among which the notion of “hybrid logical hexagon”, we show which strong reasons, inside oppositional geometry, make understand that the logical hexagon is in fact a very important and profound mathematical structure, destined to many future fruitful developments and probably bearer of a major epistemological paradigm change. (shrink)

I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt that (...) conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility, and thus to doubt the underdetermination argument. (shrink)

Åsa Burman has recently introduced the important notion of telic power and differentiated it from deontic power in an attempt to build a bridge between ideal and non-ideal social ontology. We find Burman’s project promising but we argue that more is to be done to make it entirely successful. First, there is a palpable tension between Burman’s claim that telic power can be ontologically independent of deontic power and her examples, which suggests that these forms of power share the same (...) basis. Second, it is not completely clear how telic power helps non-ideal social ontologists explain oppression, since Burman thinks that both forms of power are transparent to social agents. We offer solutions to both problems. First, we question the thesis that telic power can exist without deontic power. Burman contends that this is possible because some social roles involving telic power can exist independently of institutions, which are––in her opinion––the source of deontic power. Against Burman, we suggest that all social roles involve deontic power, whether or not they are institutional. Second, we argue that while the exercise of deontic power requires a mutual recognition of the social roles of the interacting agents and, therefore, an acceptance of the associated norms, the exercise of telic power does not require acceptance of the relevant norms. This is why invoking telic power is useful in explaining how oppression and injustice can arise. Lastly, we suggest that the relation between teleological normativity and telic power has not been fully clarified by Burman and requires a deeper analysis. (shrink)

L’immanence de l’analyse a été une base méthodologique importante pour une éthique de l’interprétation, en retenant le texte comme la plateforme critique où les actes de communication doivent converger selon le principe régulateur de la consistance sémantique de l’entente ou du différend. Le périmètre textuel devrait fonctionner comme le plan d’homogénéisation des tensions herméneutiques potentiellement hétérogènes. Toutefois, l’hétérogénéité ne peut qu’émerger de nouveau dans la textualité; par exemple, pendant l’expérience perceptive de l’oeuvre d’art, les signifiants peuvent devenir des interprétants du (...) texte en démarrant d’autres articulations sémiotiques, détachées des grammaires qui ont permis l’accès prioritaire à la signification. La délimitation de l’objet artistique est déjà une question interprétative, l’oeuvre habitant déjà un espace d’implémentation publique où elle est en relation avec d’autres identités culturelles. Par ailleurs, on connait bien la question classique de l’intertextualité, tout comme la présence d’une intentionnalité liée au cadre pratique de la production historique de l’oeuvre. Aujourd’hui, les développements des études sur l’oeuvre d’art peuvent dépasser la simple accumulation des problématiques et la parataxe d’applications disciplinaires, afin de repérer une syntaxe d’approches coordonnées. Cette visée a besoin avant tout d’interconnecter les distinctions entre perception, interprétation, analyse et usage de l’oeuvre d’art avec les différentes déterminations spatiales de cette dernière : l’énoncé, l’énonciation, l’intertexte, l’espace d’implémentation. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Michael Huemer’s phenomenal conservatism—the internalist view according to which our beliefs are prima facie justified if based on how things seems or appears to us to be—doesn’t fall afoul of Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for epistemological internalism. We start by showing that the thought experiment that Bergmann adduces to conclude that is vulnerable to his dilemma misses its target. After that, we distinguish between two ways in which a mental state can contribute to the justification (...) of a belief: the direct way and the indirect way. We identify a straightforward reason for claiming that the justification contributed indirectly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. Then we show that the same reason doesn’t extend to the claim that the justification contributed directly is subject to Bergmann’s dilemma. As is the view that seemings or appearances contribute justification directly, we infer that Bergmann’s contention that his dilemma applies to is unmotivated. In the final part, we suggest that our line of response to Bergmann can be used to shield other types of internalist justification from Bergmann’s objection. We also propose that seeming-grounded justification can be combined with justification of one of these types to form the basis of a promising version of internalist foundationalism. (shrink)

Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable property, does not provide an account of defeat, and is not a complete theory of (...) epistemic justification. This book shows that Phenomenal Conservatism is actually immune to some of these problems, though not all of them. Accordingly, it explores the prospects of integrating Phenomenal Conservatism with Explanationism (the view that epistemic justification is a matter of explanatory relations between one’s evidence and propositions supported by that evidence). The resulting theory, Phenomenal Explanationism, has advantages over Phenomenal Conservatism and Explanationism taken on their own. Phenomenal Explanationism is a highly unified, comprehensive internalist theory of epistemic justification that delivers on the promises of Phenomenal Conservatism while avoiding its pitfalls. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the emergence of the concept of the “historical a priori” at the origin of Foucault’s archeology. I emphasize the methodological function of this concept within Foucault’s archaeology, and I maintain that despite the different thesis it entails as compared to its philosophical sources, it pertains to one of the main issues of phenomenology, that is, the problematization of the relation between reality as it appears in its historicity, and transcendentality. I start from the interest (...) of the young Foucault in existential psychiatry, and I focus on the French philosophical context in which Foucault’s Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence” (1954) was conceived. My aim is to show that the first “phenomenological” phase of Foucault’s work is coherent, from a methodological point of view, with the development of archaeology intended as “historical epistemology.” I conclude by arguing that Foucault’s archaeology is methodologically linked to Canguilhem’s epistemology, in that the latter presents itself as an important attempt at linking together historicity and transcendentality. (shrink)

I show that Mizrahi’s argument against Phenomenal Conservatism is fallacious.

John Hardwig has championed the thesis (NE) that evidence that an expert EXP has evidence for a proposition P, constituted by EXP’s testimony that P, is not evidence for P itself, where evidence for P is generally characterized as anything that counts towards establishing the truth of P. In this paper, I first show that (NE) yields tensions within Hardwig’s overall view of epistemic reliance on experts and makes it imply unpalatable consequences. Then, I use Shogenji-Roche’s theorem of transitivity of (...) incremental confirmation to show that (NE) is false if a natural Bayesian formalization of the above notion of evidence is implemented. I concede that Hardwig could resist my Bayesian objection if he re-interpreted (NE) as a more precise thesis that only applies to community-focused evidence. I argue, however, that this precisification, while diminishing the philosophical relevance of (NE), wouldn’t settle the tensions internal to Hardwig’s views. (shrink)

According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, if you have an experience as if P, you acquire immediate prima facie justification for believing P. Pryor contends that dogmatism validates Moore’s infamous proof of a material world. Against Pryor, I argue that if dogmatism is true, Moore’s proof turns out to be non-transmissive of justification according to one of the senses of non-transmissivity defined by Crispin Wright. This type of non-transmissivity doesn’t deprive dogmatism of its apparent antisceptical bite.

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

This paper focuses on one of the original moments of the development of the “phenomenological” current of psychiatry, namely, the psychopathological research of Ludwig Binswanger. By means of the clinical and conceptual problem of schizophrenia as it was conceived and developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, I will try to outline and analyze Binswanger’s perspective from a both historical and epistemological point of view. Binswanger’s own way means of approaching and conceiving schizophrenia within the scientific, medical, and psychiatric (...) context of that time will lead us to grasp the epistemological stakes at the origins of his project of reforming psychiatry by means of phenomenology. I will finally attempt to upgrade and update Binswanger’s project in light of the current reappraisal of phenomenology within the ongoing debate on psychopathology engaged by studies in the field of science and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

En la consideración de numerosos asuntos y respecto de muy variadas exposiciones, el uso de expresiones como "filosófica" sugiere que debemos remitirnos a procederes, preguntas o exigencias especiales. Rabossi propone un modo de caracterizar el sentido con que usamos esas expresiones y, sobre esa base, concluye que la filosofía tal como se la practica desde hace doscientos años pretende ser una disciplina profesional pero no puede serlo debido a la índole de la preceptiva que la constituye. En este artículo se (...) examinan sus argumentos y se sostiene que, aunque no parecen suficientes para la conclusión a la que apuntan, hay razones para modificarlos de cierto modo que conducen a ese resultado. Whenever expressions like "X is philosophical" appear in different questions and assorted statements, the reference to special kinds of actions, questions or demands are suggested by these uses. Rabossi propounds a way for characterizing the sense of our using such expressions and, based on it, he states that philosophy, as it is accomplished from the last two centuries up to now, pretends to be a professional discipline but she cannot to be as such because the nature of its precepts. Rabossi's arguments are examined and it is maintained that although they do not seem to be sufficient for the pursued conclusion, there are reasons to modify them such a way to come to that conclusion. (shrink)

Some Carrollian posthumous manuscripts reveal, in addition to his famous ‘logical diagrams’, two mysterious ‘logical charts’. The first chart, a strange network making out of fourteen logical sentences a large 2D ‘triangle’ containing three smaller ones, has been shown equivalent—modulo the rediscovery of a fourth smaller triangle implicit in Carroll's global picture—to a 3D tetrahedron, the four triangular faces of which are the 3+1 Carrollian complex triangles. As it happens, such an until now very mysterious 3D logical shape—slightly deformed—has been (...) rediscovered, independently from Carroll and much later, by a logician , a mathematician and a linguist studying the geometry of the ‘opposition relations’, that is, the mathematical generalisations of the ‘logical square’. We show that inside what is called equivalently ‘n-opposition theory’, ‘oppositional geometry’ or ‘logical geometry’, Carroll's first chart corresponds exactly, duly reshap.. (shrink)

La plupart des études actuelles sur la « psychiatrie phénoménologique » séparent assez nettement les approches historiques, philosophiques et cliniques. Cet article vise à poser la problématique d’une histoire épistémologique qui dégage les enjeux des questions à l’origine du modèle méthodologique que Binswanger élabora pour la psychiatrie dès les premières décennies du XX e siècle. Dans ce but, on a choisi de se concentrer sur un ouvrage : Changements dans la conception et l’interprétation du rêve depuis les Grecs jusqu’au présent (...) (1928). Il offre en effet un panorama du contexte psychiatrique et psychologique dans lequel Binswanger traite de la méthodologie en psychopathologie. Mais il montre aussi le rôle que le questionnement du rêve a joué pour la réception épistémologique de la phénoménologie philosophique par le psychiatre qu’est Binswanger. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usual, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is “transmitted” to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have (...) implications for scientific methodology, as they provide a formal rationale for the method of indirect confirmation and the method of confirming theories by confirming their parts. (shrink)

Philosophers have claimed that education aims at fostering disparate epistemic goals. In this paper we focus on an important segment of this debate involving conversation between Alvin Goldman and Harvey Siegel. Goldman claims that education is essentially aimed at producing true beliefs. Siegel contends that education is essentially aimed at fostering both true beliefs and, independently, critical thinking and rational belief. Although we find Siegel’s position intuitively more plausible than Goldman’s, we also find Siegel’s defence of it wanting. We suggest (...) novel argumentative strategies that draw on Siegel’s own arguments but look to us more promising. (shrink)

Perceptual experience is one of our fundamental sources of epistemic justification—roughly, justification for believing that a proposition is true. The ability of perceptual experience to justify beliefs can nevertheless be questioned. This article focuses on an important challenge that arises from countenancing that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable. -/- The thesis of cognitive penetrability of perception states that the content of perceptual experience can be influenced by prior or concurrent psychological factors, such as beliefs, fears and desires. Advocates of this (...) thesis could for instance claim that your desire of having a tall daughter might influence your perception, so that she appears to you to be taller than she is. Although cognitive penetrability of perception is a controversial empirical hypothesis, it does not appear implausible. The possibility of its veracity has been adduced to challenge positions that maintain that perceptual experience has inherent justifying power. -/- This article presents some of the most influential positions in contemporary literature about whether cognitive penetration would undermine perceptual justification and why it would or would not do so. -/- Some sections of this article focus on phenomenal conservatism, a popular conception of epistemic justification that more than any other has been targeted with objections that adduce the cognitive penetrability of experience. (shrink)

The paper reviews the philosophical literature on the epistemology of modelling in contemporary economics. In particular, it focuses on open questions concerning the epistemic role of models, the validity of inferences from the models to the world, and the legitimacy of their use for purposes of explanation, prediction and intervention.

According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance's inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its antisceptical bite. This paper provides a (...) novel argument to the same conclusion and contends that it does not apply to Phenomenal Explanationism, the appearance-based account of justification alternative to PC defended by McCain and Moretti (2021). (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta-se como esboço de um estudo mais aprofundado do confronto teorético entre a filosofia de Kierkegaard e a do último Schelling. Depois de uma breve introdução de carácter histórico sobre as circunstâncias que levaram Kierkegaard a Berlin, onde haveria de permanecer entre Outubro de 1841 e Março de 1842, em ordem a poder assistir pessoalmente aos desenvolvimentos da "filosofia positiva" de Schelling (na qual esperava poder encontrar uma alternativa à lógica hegeliana) expressos nas lições sobre "Filosofia da (...) Revelação", o artigo concentra-se em particular sobre o tema da relação entre consciência e Revelação no primeiro capítulo das Migalhas Filosóficas de Kierkegaard e na lição IX da Filosofia da Revelação de Schelling. Mostra-se, assim, que apesar de nas duas obras ser possível encontrar uma relação particular entre a consciência humana e Deus ("condição" para acolher a Revelação), uma análise atenta dos textos mostra que na realidade as premissas teóricas dos dois autores são praticamente opostas. /// The article aims to present an outline of a theoretical comparison between the philosophy of Kierkegaard and the one of the latest Schelling. After a brief historical introduction about the circumstances that brought Kierkegaard to travel to Berlin (October 1841-March 1842) in order to personally follow the development of Schelling's "positive philosophy" (in which he hoped to find an alternative to the Hegelian logic), as particularly expressed in the lectures on the "Philosophy of Revelation", the article focuses on the relationship between Consciousness and Revelation in Kierkegaard's first chapter of Philosophical Fragments and Schelling's lecture IX in Philosophy of Revelation. However, if in both works it is possible to see how revelation constitutes a particular relationship between human consciousness and God (the so called "condition" to receive Revelation), the truth is that a close analysis of the texts shows how the theoretical premises of Kierkegaard and Schelling are almost opposite. (shrink)

O comportamento de apego se expressa em adultos quando estes se encontram em situações que envolvam medo, mudança ou conflito, como em casos de perda. O objetivo do presente estudo foi investigar os comportamentos de apego adulto frente à perda repentina de um ente querido. Participaram cinco adulto..

La Preisfrage de 1763 était, à l’époque, incroyablement actuelle. En effet, autour de 1761, à l’Académie de Berlin et en dehors d’elle, une somme de facteurs vint menacer la supériorité incontestée de la méthode démonstrative. Même si l’optimisme suscité par les mathématiques était encore victorieux, le paradigme de la certitude absolue était imperceptiblement en train de se transformer. On se distanciait d’un certain cartésianisme et, pour utiliser le mot de Voltaire, au « compas de la mathématique » on ajoutait « (...) le flambeau de l’expérience ». On jugeait le réquisit pur de la déduction logique trop élevé pour l’entendement humain, et l’on avait tendance à souligner les traits sensibles du plan syntaxique des figures géométriques ou des preuves des faits. Cette circonspection concernant la rhétorique de la démonstrationest bien visible dans les pages anonymes des réponses à cette Preisfrage : la plupart sont favorables à l’évidence géométrique en métaphysique, mais le scepticisme vis à vis des démonstrations mathématiques inflexibles est palpable. Le pruritus demonstrandi contenait-il déjà en lui-même, par son outrance, le germe du futur dédain pour les démonstrations en philosophie ? (shrink)